In addition, the paper also analyzes the role of foreign and domestic interest rate differentials in pulling in or pushing out of these foreign exchange flows. We found that the offset coefficient is very small and insignificant (0.16) implying that changes in credit resulted in very minimal offsetting reserve flows. The study found out that for the sample period, SBP only partially sterilized the inflows with magnitude of coefficient at (0.50) confirming the stylized facts. Results also indicate that inflows were neither pulled into the country due to high domestic interest rates due to some domestic policy nor they are pushed into Pakistan owing to low interest rates abroad. This paper also divided the sample in to two periods from
I. Introduction
Since 2000 the emerging economies have experienced a new surge in foreign exchange inflows followed by massive interventions by their central banks to prevent currency appreciation. Pakistan too experienced spurt in these inflows after September 11, 2001 . In Pakistan's case, this surge in foreign exchange inflows originated from an increase in aid and investment flows, and more importantly from the growth in workers' remittances.
This resulted in reversal of traditional market expectations of devaluation and accordingly rupee started to appreciate (see Figure 1) . The huge volume of inflows forced the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market to keep the parity between Rupee/US$ stable. The conventional wisdom asserts that central banks can intervene in foreign exchange markets to resist currency appreciation for some time because there is no simple, clear ceiling to the volume of domestic currency they can sell in forex markets. Just as conservative is the view that extended, significant intervention must eventually weaken domestic macroeconomic performance presenting the central banks with a policy impasse. The main reason for policy dilemma is that intervention in the foreign exchange market has direct consequences for the stance of monetary policy. In general, the central bank would want both to resist currency appreciation and to control the inflationary pressures. If so, injection of liquidity due to foreign exchange intervention would be in direct conflict with monetary policy of the country. To accomplish both its monetary and exchange rate targets, the central banks usually resort to sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market. 2 Regardless of exchange rate regime, sterilized intervention may be viewed as an attempt to attain independent external and internal targets in short 1 Since there was large inflows from US and Europe from expat Pakistanis, it was feared that these are one off transfers and as soon as the situation get better in US and Europe, these inflows would shrink substantially. Therefore to shield the external sector from this perceived volatility in exchange rate, SBP intervened in the market. 2 Sterilized intervention is a combination of two transactions. First the central bank conducts a nonsterilized intervention by buying foreign currency with home currency. This results in the increase in monetary base. Then the central bank sterilizes the effect on monetary base by selling a corresponding quantity of home currency denominated bonds to soak up the initial increase in the monetary base. [Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) chapter8] run. For this to be possible, domestic and foreign assets must be imperfect substitutes in private portfolio [Obstfeld (1982a) .
In the case of Pakistan, the monetary authority too, was confronted with conflicting goals as foreign exchange inflows continuously poured into the country. According to State
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) annual report FY01, page 3 " on the one hand there was an urgent need to shift government borrowings from SBP to banks and to insulate the Rupee from excessive volatility-this placed upward pressure on T-bill rates. On the other hand, efforts to increase private sector investment, ease the government's debt burden, and contain the impact of our commitment to link export finance rates to T-bill rates pushed in the opposite direction." This clearly entailed for SBP to decide on the extent of sterilization.
Thus, the challenge the monetary authority faces is to coordinate intervention with monetary policy. Therefore, in this paper we investigate empirically the questions of the need for and the success of sterilization efforts of State Bank of Pakistan by estimating sterilization coefficient. We also gauged the offset coefficient which measures the extent, to which capital flows offset policy induced changes in monetary base. More specifically it provides a useful summary measure of the scope for a domestically oriented monetary policy. Furthermore, we will analyze the role of foreign and domestic interest rate differentials in pulling in or pushing out of these foreign exchange flows. This paper is organized as follows. Following section gives us some backdrop of the issue. Section III consists of literature review. Section IV describes the theoretical framework we will be using while section V explains empirical results. Paper is concluded in section VI.
II. Backdrop
Nineties was a difficult decade for Pakistan economy. Economic growth slowed down due to various factors namely: political uncertainties, weather calamities and structural constraints. This situation further deteriorated in late nineties when Pakistan went nuclear and attracted economic sanctions from the international community. However, it was the external sector of the economy that suffered the most. The significant foreign exchange inflows of 1980s dried down after the end of Afghan war against USSR. That put the economic system of the country under severe strain. In the mean time, rising current account deficit that resulted from increase in domestic absorption and loss of competitiveness due to overvalued rupee caused fall in international reserves.
Consequently, the central bank was forced to frequently devalue domestic currency during nineties in order to correct current account imbalances (see Table A for selected economic indicators at the end of paper).
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After enduring a painful decade of low growth and contractionary demand management policies, Pakistan's economic performance since 2000 could be characterized as satisfactory. Fiscal deficit was contained within limit, inflation was low, and foreign exchange accumulation was satisfactory. In short, macroeconomic fundamentals were back on track. As part of stabilization program, Pakistan's central bank allowed a free float for its currency and dismantled the Rupee band that had been in place during FY00.
As a result rupee depreciated by 23.8 percent during the year. Consequently trade deficit fell. In order to augment its reserves, the SBP purchased US$ 2157 million from kerb market. Instead of direct intervention and moving the Rupee/Dollar band, monetary policy was the main tool to quell episodes of speculation in foreign exchange market and to smooth out the volatility caused by lumpy payments.
Post September 11, 2001; Pakistan experienced large inflows of foreign exchange and a resulting build up of foreign reserves and appreciation of the real exchange rate (see Figure 2 ). It would seem that external factors played a crucial role in brining home these foreign exchange inflows. Most noteworthy was the big upsurge in workers' remittances through official channels that resulted from the global crack down on illegal channels of money transfer. This led to the collapse of Hundi system and demise of kerb market premium over official rate. Another contributing factor was the reverse capital flight as the balances of Pakistani's came under scrutiny abroad. In addition, debt rescheduling
and new large aid inflows to Pakistan for siding with US and its allies in the war against Al Qaeda augmented the net inflows (see Table 1 of non-debt creating inflows).
The tremendous improvement in Pakistan's external sector post September 2001, either directly or indirectly, contributed to positive developments for many macroeconomic indicators. 4 For instance, workers' remittances almost doubled during FY02 in comparison with previous year to reach at US$ 2.39 billion. Together with increased official transfers, these inflows allowed SBP to augment its foreign exchange reserves and therefore perhaps a need to sterilize its impact on base money. Moreover, the current account recorded a surplus and underpinned the 6.2 percent appreciation of Pakistan 1998M7  1998M11  1999M3  1999M7  1999M11  2000M3  2000M7  2000M11  2001M3  2001M7  2001M11  2002M3  2002M7  2002M11  2003M3  2003M7  2003M11  2004M3  2004M7  2004M11  2005M3  2005M7  2005M11  2006M3  2006M7 Author's own calculation Rupee. Indeed the purchases allowed the SBP to stabilize the Exchange rate. The rationale for SBP intervention in foreign exchange market for slowing down of rupee appreciation was the fear that this upsurge in inflows might be temporary. In short, while FY01 SBP foreign exchange net purchases were to support Rupee, the FY02 buying was essentially to prevent it from strengthening too sharply. Furthermore the rupee liquidity injected through the foreign exchange purchases enabled SBP to ease its monetary policy which was contrary to FY01 when monetary policy was kept tight to support Rupee. Interestingly however, SBP reserve money growth was contained to only 9.6 percent, as injections through SBP foreign exchange purchases were sterilized by a net retirement of SBP's government securities holdings. The process of SBP-NDA reduction was particularly very intriguing, as the increased market liquidity (against SBP intervention) was neutralized without actually pursuing any explicit instrument for sterilization. Specifically, while most of the increased market liquidity was being channeled to the government securities, the government was retiring SBP debt using borrowings from commercial banks. This resulted into a reduction of SBP-NDA.
Hence, what seems to be a shift in domestic debt structure of the government actually helped the SBP's efforts to restrict monetary base expansion. Looking at sterilization during FY02, the retirement of Rs 287 billion worth of government securities with SBP more than offset the impact of SBP intervention in the 5 In FY01, the SBP foreign exchange purchases were being injected into the interbank market to lower volatility and meet lumpy payments. The SBP was net seller in interbank market during FY01. 6 The practice of sterilization had cost for SBP in terms of foregone interest earning on government securities etc. In addition, this could have increased quasi fiscal cost for government. However, low private sector credit demand left ample liquidity with the banks resulting in switch of government debt from SBP to banks without putting much pressure on interest. However we ignore this discussion here because it is not in the scope of this paper.
foreign exchange market. Consequently, as mentioned above, the reserve money growth was held down to 9.6 percent despite sizeable foreign exchange purchases by SBP.
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The FY03 too witnessed current account surplus owing to reduction in trade deficit and phenomenal increase in worker remittances to US$ 4237 million. SBP intervened heavily to stabilize the Rupee/Dollar parity by not letting it to appreciate too quickly.
Indeed we can characterize this policy to be a pseudo free float, as SBP never allowed the Rupee to move freely. The SBP in its Annual report for FY03 page 7 conceded that exchange rate practically acted as a nominal anchor for the monetary policy, which was discount rate during previous year. In contrast to FY02 position, when SBP essentially mopped up rupee liquidity resulting from its forex market interventions, FY03 saw a very deliberate reduction in these sterilization operations, despite a sharper rise in forex purchases (See SBP Annual Report FY03, page 3). This resulting liquidity flooding the banking system raised competitive pressures and led directly to fall in interest rates. As a result of low sterilization effort, reserve money grew by 14.5 percent without resulting in inflationary pressures, which can be attributed to lags in inflation dynamics.
During FY04, although net forex inflows declined relatively, the SBP continued with its loose monetary stance. In fact net credit to private sector grew by Rupee 325 billion, which was more than twice the cumulative net credit expansion in preceding three years.
The negative of this expansionary policy was the rise of inflationary expectation.
Headline inflation measured with CPI recorded at 4.6 percent. This coupled with the reduction in unilateral inflows of foreign exchange put pressure on Rupee to depreciate. 8 As stated in SBP annual report FY04, page 9; "in fact the depreciation in Rupee would have been even steeper had the central bank not defended the rupee aggressively,…".
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All of these resulted in the upward pressure on interest rates. With relatively low inflows and deliberate expansionary monetary policy, sterilization effort was on the lower side.
As the governor of the SBP stated "Despite some mopping up, the Central Bank has left excess liquidity with the banks which has driven down the cost of credit to historically low levels of 5 percent average. The banks are, therefore, reaching out to new customers 7 See SBP Annual Report for FY02. 8 Saudi oil facility ended this year. 9 State Bank of Pakistan was a net seller of foreign exchange since April 2004 (see Figure 3) particularly the middle and lower income groups by providing them agriculture credit, SME loans, mortgage loans and consumer loans. This is the most direct way the reserve accumulation is benefiting the common man…." 10 However, with inflation peaking at 9.3 percent, SBP had to switch to tightening of monetary stance during FY05. This shift in policy was more pronounced during second half of the FY05, with the benchmark 6-month T-bill yield rising by 416 basis points during this period, as against 166 basis points increase in first half of the same year.
However, despite this rise in interest rates monetary growth remained high at 19.3 percent. Current account deficit was recorded at US$ 1.4 billion, which stemmed mainly from trade deficit of US$6.2 billion during the year. However, worker remittances of US$4.0 billion helped finance this deficit. On net basis SBP was a seller of foreign exchange in market. This aggressive selling was to defend the rupee from falling.
Throughout the year, SBP remained an active player in forex market. In view of these challenges, many economists have argued that intervention should be restricted to cases where it is consistent with the central bank's inflation forecast. For instance, intervention to resist depreciation should be accompanied by the forecast that inflation would -if depreciation occurred -rise above the target during the targeting horizon. Conversely, the central bank would intervene to resist appreciation only when inflation is forecast to fall below the target. Holub (2004) argues that in the Czech
III. Literature Review
Republic such coordination has been maintained since the introduction of inflation targeting in 1998: most interventions against currency appreciation were carried out when (a) inflation was expected to fall below the target and (b) the output gap was negative.
A second question concerns the ability of monetary authorities to conduct sterilized intervention on a sustained basis. What are the limits to sterilized intervention? At least three major impediments have been discussed in the literature.
The first is the issue of the impossible trinity which asserts that with no capital controls, the central bank cannot indefinitely control both the nominal exchange rate and the money market rate. This is the classic argument of Mundell (1968) . In the case of intervention to prevent depreciation, such a limit will be often set by the reserves and contingency credit lines available to a country. Depleting reserves, at some stage, will make an interest rate increase inevitable. The limit on intervention to prevent appreciation is, however, less clear cut because If there is perfect substitutability, the net foreign assets offset to domestic credit measures is immediate and complete, provided there are no lags in portfolio adjustments [Obstfeld (1982a) ]. When the exchange rate is flexible, the level of exchange rate is determined by the supply and demand of currency. In this system, the nominal money supply becomes a policy determined variable and as in the fixed exchange rate, the central bank can attain independent monetary management only if there is imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets.
Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) argued, however, that resisting currency appreciation would prevent the domestic money market interest rate from falling, attract more inflows and thus continuously increase the need for sterilization. Eventually, the cost of sterilization would rise to high levels, leading either the interest rate to fall or the exchange rate to appreciate. Therefore according to them, sterilization is difficult and costly. In the long run, therefore, appreciation becomes unavoidable because even in the case of a fall in interest rate and the resulting increase in inflation will lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
In fact, large-scale sterilized intervention had previously led to sharp increases in shortterm interest rates -particularly in countries with a history of inflation. Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) document evidences during the early 1990s. In Chile the short-term interest rate (30-to 89-day bank lending rate) rose from about 28% in the period (1988-89) preceding capital inflows to over 46% during the period (January to July 1990) of heavy inflows and sterilization. The rise in interest rates was as dramatic in Colombia, with prime lending rates of banks more than doubling from 22% during the pre-inflow period to over 47% during the peak of sterilization (January to November 1991). Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) conclude that "sterilization policies were either abandoned or scaled back or complemented by capital controls, as it became evident that the high domestic interest rates were attracting more inflows". Reisen (1993) , however, argued that sterilization is easier. He asserts that some Asian countries have been able to achieve the impossible trinity of open financial markets, fixed exchange rates and the monetary independence. Frankel (1994) examines the issue of foreign exchange inflows and the ability of the monetary authorities to conduct sterilized intervention. He concludes that sterilization is expensive when the cause of the capital inflows is a rise in money demand or an increase in exports. Attempts to sterilize such inflows would raise interest rates, leading to even larger inflows, thereby rendering the sterilization practice as difficult and expensive. On the other hand, when the source of foreign exchange inflows is an external shock, sterilized intervention is not likely to alter the interest rates and hence it can be a viable option in the short run.
Secondly, imperfect substitutability among assets means that changes in the supplies of such assets as a result of sterilization affect relative prices. Classic models e.g. Argy and Murray (1985) typically assume that the central bank sells domestic bonds to sterilize. If domestic bonds (whose yield carries a risk premium) are imperfect substitutes of foreign bonds, the authorities would have to pay higher interest rates on their sterilization bonds to encourage bondholders to switch out of foreign bonds.
Finally, the high costs of issuing high-yield local currency debt to acquire low-yielding reserves can exacerbate fiscal deficits and so threaten macroeconomic stability. This can be particularly serious in countries that already have large public sector debts. In some circumstances, the combination of high costs and increasing reserves may provide a signal to markets that policy is on an unsustainable path and so accentuate destabilizing capital flows.
Calvo (1991) argued that such effects would eventually weaken central banks' antiinflation credibility by raising the probability of debt monetization and high inflation.
Comparing the high interest rate differentials of Chile and Colombia with Argentina, which followed a policy of non-sterilized intervention during the early 1990s, Calvo et al (1993) , cast serious doubts on the desirability of sterilized intervention because it raised debt service costs at a time when countries were attempting to bring domestic debt expansion under control.
In short, various possible consequences of sterilizing prolonged or very large interventions could be that it could undermine monetary objectives; it could compromise financial stability; and it could impose heavy financing costs on the monetary authorities.
Despite the possibility of these consequences and the concerns about coordination between intervention and monetary policy, monetary authorities do engage in sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market. Since, failure to sterilize market intervention and the consequent increase in domestic liquidity can result in inflation as well as unwanted movement in exchange rate. In addition, the real exchange rate is also influenced by the ability of central banks to sterilize. Under these circumstances, determining the offset and sterilization coefficients of the central bank could be useful in terms of measuring of the scope and the stance of the monetary policy. Indeed, this issue has discussed in the literature by several authors.
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11 Offset coefficient indicates the fraction of any domestic credit expansion reversed by central bank foreign reserve losses in the same period while sterilization coefficient indicates that the degree of Kouri and Porter (1974) and Obstfeld (1982a) pointed out that the offset coefficient is subject to a possible sterilization bias. 12 The source of the bias is the possible endogeneity of changes in NDA, when central bank follows a sterilization policy. If capital inflow is systematically sterilized, the change in NDA will be correlated with the disturbance term in the NFA equation (or capital-flow equation), therefore OLS estimates will be inconsistent. To remedy this problem, Argy and Kouri (1972) suggested that the offset and sterilization equations be estimated by two-stage least squares using instrumental variables. 13 They found evidence of partial sterilization on part of Germany and the Netherlands, but inconclusive evidence for Italy. Kouri and Porter (1974) crisis period, it seems that the CBRT was reacting to changes in net foreign assets (NFA), real exchange rate and not to interest differential. While in the post financial crisis period, it seems that the CBRT reacted more to NFA changes compared to the pre-crisis period and also interest rate differentials gained importance in the monetary policy framework.
The sterilization coefficients have been found as 0.82 and 0.91 for the first and second periods respectively by using OLS.
Another study for Turkey on the same subject by Celasun et al, (1999) computed the sterilization coefficients. They estimated Net Domestic Assets (NDA) by using twostage least squares, for the period February 1990 to June 1996, wherein the reaction function allows net domestic assets to respond to other variables, such as, net foreign assets, real exchange rate, real GDP and consolidated government deficit. 14 For the whole period, the sterilization coefficient was found as (-) 0.37, which indicated partial sterilization of 37 percent of reserve inflows (given that lags of NFA proved insignificant).
Emir et al (2000) estimated monetary policy reaction function for Turkey and calculated the offset and sterilization coefficient using simultaneous equation system for the periods of 1990 to 1993 and 1995 to 1999. The results showed that in the first period which is the pre-crisis period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) , low degree of sterilization, offset and neutralization coefficients, which suggest that the CBRT implemented a relatively accommodative policy to fiscal policy by expanding domestic credits to finance budget deficit. In contrast, in the second period which is the post-crisis period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , the CBRT implemented more active policy by sterilizing most of the foreign assets increase and neutralizing the government credits by reducing the banking sector credits which was reflected in the high level of sterilization, offset and neutralization coefficient.
Siklos (2000) focused on short run impact of sterilization on monetary policy and found that Central Bank of Hungary (NBH) fully sterilized capital inflows during 1992:01 to 1997:03 and the sterilization coefficient thus found was 1.002 by using OLS method.
In other studies on the issues, Renhack and Mondino (1988) and Clavijo (1986) for Colombia; Blejer and Leiderman (1981) This study for Pakistan is different from previous studies as it focuses on the current episode of inflows that SBP encountered after 2001. In addition, contrary to this study, none of the previous studies focused on offset coefficient or tried to focus on the causes of inflows. Also the data is handled with more care in this paper. Furthermore, by using the VAR, this study tackled the issue of endogeneity of domestic credit with the foreign exchange interventions.
IV. Theoretical Framework
In order to understand and interpret the relation between inflows, sterilization and SBP's monetary policy conduct, we will use the theoretical model developed by Kouri and Porter (1974) . This model is augmented by monetary policy reaction function in line with Obstfeld (1982b) . 15 The sterilization and offset coefficients are calculated. The basic assumptions of the model are fixed exchange rate, small country, and wages and prices 15 Similar techenique was used by Christensen (2004) for the Czech Republic.
are assumed as given. Also the balance of current account is exogenous. Small country assumption implies that domestic demand of foreign asset is small relative to world supply. Any change in domestic bond does not affect the price of these assets. It is also assumed that foreigners can only hold domestic bonds not domestic currency.
Assumptions:
− Fixed exchange rate. when it is close to -1, which implies that a a change in domestic credit is completely offset by a corresponding change in opposite direction in the international reserves, leaving the domestic stock of money unchanged.
The model can be made more realistic by incorporating monetary authority reaction function [Obstfeld (1982) b] to the system comprising equations (16) Under such circumstances, domestic money supply is independent of balance of payment swings and is entirely determined by the exogenous factors Z . 16 On the other hand, 0 b = implies that any change in NFA will entirely be reflected in MB.
Empirical questions, Econometric methodology and data issues:
The preceding section examined the theoretical relationship between capital flows, domestic interest rates, and sterilization policies. A second, and related question, is to what extent foreign or internal factors pushed or pulled foreign capital to Pakistan, respectively. This question relates to the [Frankel( 1994) ] conclusion that unnecessarily high domestic interest rates will prevail when sterilization is undertaken in the case of an internal shock such as higher domestic money demand or increase in exports (pull factor). On the other hand, sterilization will be more appropriate when capital is pushed by some external shock. The empirical model contains a relation for foreign reserves to answer these two questions.
A third question is whether monetary policy became endogenous to keep money supply constant. In other words, given the significant foreign exchange inflows, the State Bank of Pakistan may have responded by tightening the domestic credit. If this was indeed the 16 This can be shown as
case, domestic credit will be endogenous in the relation of the foreign reserves, which will give rise to sterilization bias. The sterilization bias arises if the sterilization parameter, b, is significant, implying that the authorities systematically varied domestic credit in response to foreign exchange inflows. The failure to account for such a policy in single equation regression, where the endogenous domestic credit component is treated as exogenous, would give rise to biased estimates. In order to avoid this problem, the econometric model should allow for domestic credit to be endogenous.
Therefore, a VAR is estimated, containing domestic credit, domestic interest rates, and foreign reserves as endogenous variables. In order to examine whether the foreign interest rates pushed foreign exchange inflow to Pakistan, it was included as an exogenous variable in the system. This system can be represented as following 17 (19) (20) from monetary base ( MB ) according to the method of Leiderman (1984) . (22) ( 1 ) [] / Following [Obstfeld(1982b) ], this later component is calculated as following.
(1 ) The variables are constructed so as to avoid the non stationary. The unit root test found that for all variables used we can reject the hypothesis of unit root. Also since we are dealing with monthly data, seasonal unit root is also checked by using the methodology developed by Franses (1991) , which is an extension of the HEGY test developed by Hylleberg, Engle, Granger, and Yoo (1990) . The result indicated that there is no seasonal unit root (See Table F 
V. Empirical Evidence
This section first presents the results of the VAR regressions specified in the previous section and then analyze the impact on each of the model's endogenous variables using impulse response functions.
Estimation Results
The VAR model was estimated by a standard ordinary least square (OLS) procedure, the results are shown in Table 2 . Lag length was selected as 1, using SBC information criteria. This adjustment time, however, may be justified, because model only contains monetary variables that adjust relatively quickly. The estimation yielded intuitively appealing results. Firstly, domestic credit was not found to be significantly affected by any of the variables in the model, except FR. More specifically, foreign reserves were found to have significantly affected domestic credit. Sterilization was partial (sterilization coefficient = -0.501). As discussed in previous section that in some circumstances, the central bank may want both to resist currency appreciation and to ease its monetary stance. If so, intervention would create no conflict with monetary policy and hence no need to sterilize. In case of Pakistan, after the gush of inflows in FY02, SBP sterilized heavily because of the fact that it had doubts regarding the persistence of these inflows.
However, after it realized that inflows are mainly non-debt creating and that there is a need to loosen up its monetary stance; it reduced its sterilization operation significantly in following years (see footnote 10).
In addition the negative sign of CAM coefficient (-0.248) according to theory is correct which says ; that current account balance inflow results in the negative change in the domestic credit (DC); however remained insignificant. This too is an evidence of the sterilization practice; albeit partial, undertaken by the State Bank of Pakistan. This result is in line with the stylized facts and anecdotes.
The reserve equation also reveals interesting results. The changes in foreign reserves following the changes in domestic credit are often used as a measure of monetary independence. There is a large degree of independence, when offset coefficient is close to zero given that only small proportion of a change in reserve money will be offset by balance of payment movement of capital flows. Interestingly, the offset coefficient is very small and insignificant (0.16) implying that changes in credit resulted in almost insignificant offsetting reserve flows. It could also be an evidence of low capital mobility due to capital controls and the absence of capital account convertibility. Another explanation can be the low substitutability between Pakistani and foreign assets. It can also be augured that since majority of foreign exchange inflows were non-debt creating, the chances of changes in reserves in the presence of changes in domestic credit (DC) were minimal.
A second, and related question, is to what extent foreign or internal factors pushed or pulled foreign capital to Pakistan, respectively. This question relates to the (Frankel 1994 ) conclusion that unnecessarily high domestic interest rates will prevail when sterilization is undertaken in the case of an internal shock from higher domestic money demand or increase in exports (pull factor). On the other hand, sterilization will be more appropriate when capital is pushed by some external shock. Interestingly results show the insignificant coefficients of the domestic and foreign interest rates which imply that interest rates had not played any role in the foreign exchange inflows in Pakistan. That means inflows were neither pulled into the country due to high interest rates because of some domestic policy, 19 nor they are pushed into Pakistan due to low interest rates abroad. Rather it supports the assertion that inflows were a result of an exogenous shock.
It would seem that external factors played a crucial role in brining home these foreign exchange inflows. Most noteworthy was the big upsurge in workers' remittances through official channels that resulted from the global crack down on illegal channels of money transfer. This led to the collapse of Hundi system and demise of kerb market premium over official rate. We also estimated same model for two sub samples. Break date is taken as March 2004 on the basis of the fact that inflation started accelerating after this date. Therefore sub-19 Frankel (1994) argues that inflows could be the result of a increase in domestic money demand after some kind of stabilization program. Although Pakistan at that time was under IMF's stabilization program, yet we found no evidence of this connection. 20 As the governor of the SBP stated in March 2004 in his paper presented in Pakistan Administrative Staff College "Despite some mopping up, the Central Bank has left excess liquidity with the banks which has driven down the cost of credit to historically low levels of 5 percent average. The banks are, therefore, reaching out to new customers particularly the middle and lower income groups by providing them agriculture credit, SME loans, mortgage loans and consumer loans. This is the most direct way the reserve accumulation is benefiting the common man…." 20 sample one represents the low inflation period while sub-sample two represents when the State Bank of Pakistan encountered inflation threat and tightened its monetary stance. Table 3 represents results regarding sub-sample one. Sterilization is almost 66% which is more than the full sample estimate and in line with our expectation. In addition to this the negative sign of CAM coefficient (-0.628) is correct and significant.
Contrary to the full sample, the offset coefficient although very small (0.253) but is insignificant, implying that changes in credit resulted in very small offsetting reserve flows. The results of domestic interest rate equation too have some interesting points.
The coefficient of reserves (-11.331 ) in this equation is significant and has plausible sign. It reflects on the fact that sterilization was only partial and that had exerted negative pressures on the domestic interest rates. This was also evident from unprecedented fall in bench mark 6-Month Treasury bill rates from 10.96 at the start of the sample to 1.74 by the end of the sample period. was in the form of net sales to support the exchange rate (see Figure 3) . However, SBP not sterilizing its forex intervention was also consistent with its tight monetary stance during this period due to inflation concern 21 . With almost no sterilization, the insignificant offset coefficient (-0.1462 A shock in domestic credit levels leads to an immediate reduction in domestic interest rates, followed by a converging toward zero in the remaining four months (the first column of graphs). In terms of reserves, a tighter credit policy is followed by a surge in capital inflows, albeit of smaller magnitude.
The impact of a shock to foreign reserves on domestic interest rates causes a significant reduction in interest rates initially. This perhaps indicates partial sterilization and resulting intentional gush of liquidity in the market following the interventions. Impact of shock of foreign reserves on domestic credit levels too show a fall of domestic credit (graphs in first and third row of the second column). As previously found, the empirical analysis finds support for the sterilization bias hypothesis.
The impact of a shock to domestic interest rates on foreign reserves and domestic credit is relatively insignificant. More importantly, this confirms the previous results that flows
were not a result of domestic interest rates.
VI. Conclusion:
This paper analyzed three empirical questions. The first question is to what extent monetary authority maintained monetary independence in its attempt to insulate the money supply from the surge in foreign exchange inflows during the period under consideration. This question is examined by estimating the offset coefficient.
Interestingly, the offset coefficient for full sample is very small and insignificant (0.16) implying that changes in credit resulted in very minimal offsetting reserve flows. It is also an evidence of low capital mobility in the absence of capital account convertibility.
Another explanation can be the low substitutability between Pakistani and foreign assets.
It can also be argued that since majority of foreign exchange inflows were non-debt Response of R to ID Response of ID to ID Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
creating, the chances of changes in reserves in the presence of changes in domestic credit (DC) were minimal.
We also analyzed was the sterilization policy of SBP. We found out that for the full sample period, SBP only partially sterilized the inflows. Generally, the central bank would want both to resist currency appreciation and to control inflationary pressures. If so, foreign exchange intervention would be in direct conflict with monetary policy of the country and the monetary authorities will find it harder to prevent appreciation pressure while at the same time raising the interest rate. Thus, a first challenge the monetary authority faces is to coordinate intervention with monetary policy. However, in case of Pakistan, the economy was very slow and the inflationary pressures were almost absent at the beginning of the period under study. Thus SBP resorted to expansionary monetary policy. For this reason, foreign exchange intervention need not be sterilized fully (only 50 percent). This resulted in gush of liquidity in market and interest rates in fact dipped. This is also in accord with the [Frankel( 1994) ] conclusion that unnecessarily high domestic interest rates will prevail when sterilization is undertaken in the case of an internal shock such as higher domestic money demand or increase in exports (pull factor).
On the other hand, sterilization will be more appropriate when capital is pushed by some external shock. Interestingly results show the insignificant coefficients of the domestic and foreign interest rates which imply that interest rates had not played any role in the foreign exchange inflows in Pakistan. That mean inflows were neither pulled into the country due to some domestic policy, interest rates nor they are pushed into Pakistan due to low interest rates abroad. Rather it supports the assertion that inflows were a result of an exogenous shock i.e, September 11, 2001. It would seem that external factors played a crucial role in brining home these foreign exchange inflows. Most noteworthy was the big upsurge in workers' remittances through official channels that resulted from the global crack down on illegal channels of money transfer. 
